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INTRODUCTION 
anthropology is a theory and an approach which has not 
iered or used in political science research. This paper in- 
al comments on an earlier version of this work by Gerald Benjamin, Leon 
Hinckley, Herbert M. Kritzer, Beatrice L. Lewis, Ann McCann,  and 
I. Merelman. I  am also grateful  for the suggestions of the editor and 
ics, New York University,  New York, New York  10003. 
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and applies it to a research problem in American 
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is not to learn about the formal universals of the human 
learn about these two political oppositions and their rela- 
politics. Deep structure is of interest when we move from 
Is  to the social-psychological and substantive univer- 
n understanding and explaining the surface-level rela- 
o social scientists. 
which  follow,  two  binary  oppositions  existing  in 
introduced. Relationships between the two are first 
onal assumptions. These assumptions, however, are 
t with available scholarly evidence. A better explana- 
between the oppositions is then presented along with 
ly,  after  arguing  that  one  structural  explanation 
ns, extensions to other surface-level phenomena are 
hat structural anthropology provides a useful approach 
relationships between several literatures rarely considered 
n fact inexorably related and beneficially combined. 
thesized relationships among several data sets are 
n, provide the first systematic evidence of several 
AND FOREIGN 
OPPOSITIONS 
oppositions considered here are the distinctions be- 
between two categories of public policy. Consider first 
the Democratic and the Republican parties. Clearly 
exists in most parts of the American culture: For 
with the Democratic party is to generally 
elected as a Republican is, in general, 
different national, state, and local 
they vote for different 
on different sides of 
the state legislatures, 
culture is considered, the oppositions introduced below can be extended 
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ncept which derives from their knowledge of. .  .  membership 
~p.  .  .together with the value and emotional significance of 
1."  For officeholders social identity refers directly to their 
ion. 
le Republican/Democratic  distinction is clear enough to give 
meanings, the boundary between the two is not well de- 
)lit-ticket  voting, "roll-off," and "drop-off' (Burnham, 1970) 
)portion of the electorate identifying with a political party 
lete; of those who do  identify with a political party, variable 
accord with  their party (Crotty and Jacobson,  1980); party 
iolatile, as are aggregate election returns; legislators rarely 
lembership as the sole cue for voting decisions (Clausen, 
he ideological distinctiveness of aspects of the parties seem 
boundary between the parties is crossed easily and often, 
dered "loose" [see Leach (1976: 33-36) for a definition of 
Merelman (1984) for examples and definitions of the con- 
here]. But even though the boundary is looser, the party 
rom being lost. In the general case, Allen and Wilder (1975) 
en group beliefs are similar, the minimal process of in and 
:ization is enough to make in group favoritism persist (see 
ijfel, 1973; Sole et al., 1975). In fact, there is even some 
evidence that when groups have similar values, intergroup 
actually heightened-plausibly  in order to protect group 
,  party boundaries are weakening but do not seem in danger 
:aning . 
binary opposition to be considered here is the distinction 
.ican "bipartisan" approach to foreign policy and the par- 
domestic policies. It is an often stated aspiration to keep 
:ign policy, in both congressional deliberations and public 
cs stops at the water's edge," it is often written (Bliss and 
'his distinction guarantees that even when politics is part 
iecisions, it is usually within the rhetorical constraints of 
e boundary between the way citizens and leaders deal with 
tic policies may not be as strong as it once was, but it does 
I  relevant. 
ge body of social-psychological work which may partially 
Ice of these oppositions in terms of in group/out group 
ample, Stein (1976) finds in a review of empirical literature 
lines that inter-group "conflict does increase internal cohe- 
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unong others, Freud and early frustration-aggression theorists. 
nces of in group/out group conflict for which Tajfel cites 
e the increased "positive evaluation of the ingroup or its pro- 
)emocratic/Republican  opposition,  the most  pronounced 
titudinal distinctions are likely to occur when the parties try 
atus and power of each other (Brown and Ross, 1982). Rele- 
)f accentuated party distinctiveness,  out group discrimina- 
:ened levels of inter-party verbal combat include legislative 
ich the president  or other leaders of the parties have their 
ake, electoral campaigns in which there is an attack on the 
f the opposition group, and in debates in which the parties 
ntal principles on which the opposition makes its case. 
aradox of these two oppositions is that the same political 
whed apart by the party opposition are pulled together on 
atters. We will see that for party leaders, these cross-pressures 
One of the contributions of this paper, therefore, is to sug- 
k  for understanding this problem. 
OPPOSITION SIMILARITIES 
Uy,  these two oppositions have been treated separately or as 
lated; after all, they are prima facie  different phenomena. 
usefully studied together? Are the two binary oppositions 
hey are, what form does the relationship take? Guided by 
ternative answers to these questions are now explored. 
itional and clearly plausible connection is that referred to 
)b (1957:  198), and mentioned by many others: "The two 
s that normally may be expected to favor the achievement 
'peration  in  foreign  affairs  are  the  nonideological nature 
ties and the absence of strict party discipline in congress." 
when  there is less partisanship (i.e.,  weak  boundaries be- 
),  bipartisanship in foreign policy is easier to achieve. The 
: when the definitional, attitudinal, and behavioral boun- 
Republican and the Democratic parties breaks down, the 
I foreign policy bipartisanship and domestic policy partisan- 
lter and less permeable; that is, partisan politics would be 
i the boundary and infect foreign policy decision-making. 
Crabb  refers  to  the  loose  party  boundary  by  its 
nature emphasizes that this cultural code is very different 
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contradictory historical and cross-sectional examples. 
>ugh there is considerable evidence that American political 
ming more permeable, loose, and porous (Crotty and Jacob- 
e is also evidence-  or at least widespread expert opinion- 
llitics are increasingly infecting the foreign policy arena. As 
ier Chace (1978) as representative of scholarly, journalistic, 
on: "The kind of broad consensus that obtained during the 
. which became a shibboleth of American foreign policy may 
~ssible  short of war." 
: with this is a dramatic increase in suggestions of how to 
~gn-bipartisan/domestic-partisan  boundary. These proposals 
:  ad hoc bipartisan groups in congress to follow important 
ssues (Hamilton,  1978), increasing  congressional expertise 
I, establishing  committees  of  the  president's  cabinet  and 
ngress  (Manning,  1977), increasing  politically  responsible 
America's  leaders (Bax,  1977), and having the president act 
lould encourage party leaders in congress to work more close- 
)reign policy issues (Frye and Rogers, 1979). Of course, direct 
ses would be better evidence of this point, but none exist.4 
,  in this historical example, the strength of the boundary in 
3 binary oppositions seemed to vary together-loosely  de- 
es  between foreign and domestic politics being more likely 
loosely defined parties. The initial hypothesis of an inverse 
hough consistent with conventional wisdom, is not supported 
~mple. 
td  example, consider two types of people generally distinguish- 
iomic levels (with education weighted heavily in the distinc- 
.lyses have shown political parties to be more salient to those 
S groups; these groups are more polarized along partisan lines 
kely to identify with, and be active in, a political party than 
IPS (Ladd and Lipset,  1971; Ladd with Hadley,  1978). 
upper SES groups are also more likely to support a bipar- 
iicy and to prefer bipartisan foreign policies. For example, 
1973: Ch. 5) identifies a "follower mentality" as characteriz- 
I, "take as cues for their own opinion [on war in particular 
affairs in general] the issue position of prominent opinion 
earch which could usefully establish this relationship. One example might 
lyze samples of debates on the House and Senate floors on foreign and on 
sues. Levels of conflict could then be compared and assessed. Political Parties 
leaders," espe 
higher SES g 
It may s 
are both mon 
the particular 
sistent with th~ 
with a clear  L 
to understand 
be more like11 
Thus,  i 
RepublicadD 
tisan domestic 
the original h 
As  a fin 
leaders of the 
solely based o 
the Republica 
members. Thc 
to these two g 
tighter for the 
Establishing 
Republican/D 
foreigddome, 
evidence of th 
the literature. 
With rol 
of five post-pl 
be explored. B 
position (see C 
the unit of ana 
tatives voted a1 
avoid controvc 
indicates that tl 
A potent 
by representat 
the standard er 
decisions),  all 
therefore not 1 
in congress are 
'Since this is a pot 
biased estimates 
Foreign Policy  89 
ly the president. Mueller's survey analyses clearly show that 
ps  have higher proportions of "followers." 
1 somewhat contradictory that those in upper SES groups 
rtisan and more likely to be "followers," particularly since 
.h on which they are following the leader may not be con- 
elatively strong partisan predispositions. However, someone 
manding of the differences between the parties is likely 
en this boundary should be breached, and would therefore 
support such an action under appropriate circumstances. 
his  second  example,  for  those  groups  in  which  the 
matic boundary is tight, the bipartisan foreign policy/par- 
icy boundary is also tight. This is additional evidence against 
thesis; the oppositions do seem to vary together. 
:xample, consider the differences  between members and 
)use of Representatives. Since leadership in the House is 
ie political party distinctions, it is a safe assumption that 
Iemocratic  boundary  is tighter  for the leaders than the 
estion then concerns the salience of the other opposition 
ps; the proposition above indicates that this boundary is 
nbers, while the two previous examples suggest the reverse. 
is  latter  possibility-that  the  porousness  of  the 
matic  boundary  varies  in  the  same  direction  as  the 
policy  boundary -would  provide  the  first  systematic 
bipartisan foreign policy" hypothesis,  in this paper or in 
11  data from the first session (for comparability) of each 
iential election congresses (1961-1977), this question can 
icluding those votes on which the president took a public 
:ressional Quarterly) and using the representative's vote as 
s, those roll calls in which a larger proportion of represen- 
eighted more heavily. Although some representatives might 
11  ("important")  votes, a cursory examination of roll calls 
veighting is generally in accord with conceptual importance. 
xoblem with the analysis is the clustering of observations 
and by roll call, possibly causing an underestimation  of 
;. However, because the data set is so large (154,709 voting 
the standard errors are very small, and a correction  is 
y to change this appre~iably.~  Also, since many decisions 
lcluded long before or entirely without a formal roll call, 
cross-sectional design, heteroskedasticity would produce inefficient and 
analysis of the residuals, however, indicates no major problems. 90  I  King 
tion bias (see Barnow et al., 1980). Finally, because only 
nal  session  of  each  presidency  was  used,  honeymoon 
se problems.  However,  because these 
e honeymoon effect, it is unlikely 
is of other sessions would never- 
.  Qualifications aside, these data remain among the best 
at present to analyze these questions. 
litate comparison, all equations explain the probability 
president,  and  all  control  for  the  effects  of region 
eadership, "In" (i.e., president's) and "Out" (i.e., opposi- 
ip (Republican/Democratic party differences are not 
ison to In/Out party differences), issue area, presi- 
The consequence of this procedure is to  take into ac- 
rival hypotheses about voting with the pre~ident.~  The 
ysis of tabular data. In party members are expected 
more than Out party members. In the case of bipar- 
he In/Out party split in support of the president is 
ter on domestic than on foreign policy decisions. 
r the possibility that there is more variation within 
mestic and foreign policy than between them, there 
d  four  domestic  policy  categories  of roll  calls. 
ies is consistent with varied results from separate- 
el (1974) and Clausen (1973) for similar domestic 
for similar foreign policy codings)]. 
d with all years (1961-1 977) combined because 
d that similar relationships generally hold up 
enefits of saving space and reducing complex- 
icted values of a logistic equation explaining 
er voting with the president.'  Estimated pro- 
rties across the seven policy areas appear in 
rence between the In and Out parties for a 
a1 distance between the lines in the figure), 
daries for that policy area. 
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e in leadership support for the president: In foreign policy, 
F an In party congressional leader supporting the president 
~tage  points more than Out party leaders (excluding defense). 
it in party leadership support for the president is about twice 
Ir domestic policy categories. Thus, among the party leader- 
lear difference, a very tight boundary, between politics in 
which  tends  to be  bipartisan-and  politics  in  domestic 
nds to be partisan. This is witnessed by the clear distinction 
and right sides of the figure. 
I presentation, Figure 2 displays the same data, but for the 
hip of the House. The difference between the two figures 
mg the members there is considerably less distinction (i.e., 
s)  between  foreign  and  domestic  policy  decision-making 
: left and right sides of the figure). There is, however, still 
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d from the PM,MI logit  model.  d.f.  = 48,  G2  =  10667.35.  Note: 
i, model abbreviations are as follows: Issue or policy area (I), Presi- 
ty Leader's position (L), and party membership (M). King 
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lip. For example, on voting for foreign aid decisions there 
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voting  with  the  president.  In contrast, in  the government 
~tegory,  In party members are about ten points more likely 
:  president than Out party members.  But although the dif- 
he correct direction, the boundaries are nowhere near as tight 
leaders represented  in Figure  1. 
 is example, as in the previous two, the two binary opposi- 
ry together: When the Republican/Democratic  boundary is 
le  party  leaders),  the  Foreign-Bipartisan/Domestic-Partisan 
) tight. When there are somewhat weaker party distinctions 
embers), there are also looser distinctions between types of 
m or partisan) in different policy areas (foreign or domestic). 
In  alternative explanation is needed. 
TWO BINARY OPPOSITIONS -  ONE 
UNDERLYING STRUCTURE 
proposition was that the two codes varied inversely: When 
etween  one was  tight  the  other  should  be  loose.  This 
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though not extensively explored in the literature-  was sup- 
~ble  argument and conventional political science wisdom. It 
ients in scholarly articles and as a "well known fact" in many 
ever, empirical evidence from three examples demonstrated 
bably not the case. Rather, the boundaries between the codes 
ogether -  when one code was loose, the other code was loose 
'es us with evidence of a relationship but with no explanation. 
derive an explanation, it is important to recognize that im- 
:ussion thus far is that each of these binary oppositions is 
phoric symbol for the other. It was implied that the opposi- 
:ther  or apart or that one caused the other. An alternative 
d the basis for the explanation to be offered, is that the two 
netonyrnic; they are contiguous to each other. In other words, 
lsition is a structural transformation of the other: One fun- 
ue  underlies both distinctions. 
on structural basis for these two codes is the distinction be- 
'they" (or, more generally, between "same" and "different;" 
sed because they have more direct relevance to the surface- 
1s  of interest). The concept of "we"  does not have meaning 
~g  concept of "they" is contrasted and defined. This distinc- 
:d  in  many  areas:  For example,  David  Truman's  "Wave 
:st  group formation is based on this distinction: "Organiza- 
terorganization," he writes (Truman, 1956). Implied is that 
ma1 organization, the counterorganization would not have 
i group (as "we")  without the first group forming (and iden- 
:S  as "we"  and everyone else as "they"). 
rinciple can be applied to Middle Eastern politics: Concomi- 
irp increase in immigration of Jews to Palestine earlier in 
their self-identification as "we,"  and others as "they," was 
n of the Arabs living in the area as "we,"  and the Jews as 
1978); efforts at linguistic  distinctiveness  also  increased 
)d  (Seckback,  1974). War, for example, could  not  exist 
:hey opposition. 
~f course, many political phenomena which do not derive 
listinction, as when political action is based on a sense of 
msensus. In the first presidential  elections, for example, 
emphasized that the political party to whom the speaker 
wesented, or in fact actually was, the will of the nation. 
1976 "National Unity Party," and Reagan's  1984 appeal 
~tism"  are more recent examples. 
Democratic/Republican  opposition can be reformulated 
r  as  "my  party/other  party,"  and  the  Foreign- 
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-om this perspective, these two oppositions are really surface- 
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iition. 
relationship -  the binary oppositions varying together -  and 
planation-a  structural identity -  have been assembled. But 
ructure is of academic and exploratory interest (and remains 
ence), it is the political content as presently conceptualized 
en of interest to political  scientists.  These findings must 
ted back to the original substantive problem.Vn sum, why 
relationship of interest? 
)brewation is that strong and clearly defined political par- 
ipartisan operation of foreign policy and the usual partisan 
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ith a strong we/they  opposition, there is the possibility of 
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st likely when the issue defines the we/they  opposition as 
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B,  but it seems likely to be most frequent in foreign policy. 
well-defined Republican/Democratic  distinction  leads to 
i between foreign policy bipartisanship and domestic policy 
ed  on systematic evidence,  this effectively redefines  the 
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STRUCTURAL EXTENSIONS 
umerous  (surface-level) manifestations  of  the structural 
position. Examples from Truman's wave theory of interest 
ind from Middle Eastern politics have already been pro- 
es of other applications could be explicated in considerable 
shon examples,  consider:  Explanations  of  social  group 
nts for the psychological and sociological necessity of the 
ve been satisfied here, but for present purposes. I concentrate on using 
gy  to understand  the surface-level phenomena  of primary interest to 
circumstances when inter-group competition does not lead to in group 
982: 16); Rabbi,  and deBrey (1971); Rabbie and Wilkens (1971); Rab- 
.); Rabbie el 01.  (1974); and Horwitz and Rabbie (1982). Political Parties a1 
family or its su 
tions of the orie 
political party; 
the appeal of s] 
named for loca 
pics (one telev 
World"). The 1: 
structuralist ml 
related to the I 
Another r 
is the institutic 
duct of foreign 
legislators are 
president. In d 
becomes more 
Thus far, 
political univel 
same social-ps: 
distinctions be 
While the twi 
ecutive and It 
from regardi 
branches of 
guarantee bij 
The ques 
explicitly addr, 
argues is, inter 
from its envirc 
tion is clearly I 
in the average 
didates for Sp 
out of the Hou 
ship. Thus, the 
congress and t 
From the 
in the same dil 
vironment, ant 
an increased p8 
ment; this agre 
we/they  oppo 
sional/presidei 
It should 
tional oppositi~ 
)reign Policy  95 
ates; understanding ethnocentricity and racism; explora- 
of the nation-state; explanations of the development of the 
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CONCLUSIONS 
ge of structural anthropology, deep structure, in the form 
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content rather than structural) manifestations have been 
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nderlying structure in terms of all possible combinations 
this analysis also found that the translation process from 
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idential relations, bipartisanship verses partisanship, and 
an all be usefully understood within this framework. More 
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,een any other pair is also likely to be strong. 
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es" and the "bipartisan foreign policy" literatures -  with 
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the bipartisan  foreign policy and the two presidencies 
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